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Decapod sentience: Promising framework and evidence
Commentary on Crump et al. on Decapod Sentience
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Abstract: Strong points of the target article by Crump et al. are that it offers clear criteria for
judging whether decapods are sentient, an effective semi-quantitative grading system for this
purpose, and an astute, critical review of the literature. It concludes plausibly that major
subgroups of decapods are sentient. A minor problem is that it includes classical, Pavlovian
learning as a marker of sentience along with the more valid marker of complex (e.g., operant)
learning. Another minor problem is that it does not distinguish results that are negative because
of likely absence of sentience from results that are negative because they have not yet been
gathered. Future studies should explore how decapods are sentient with so few neurons in their
nervous system (<100,000).
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The target article by Crump et al. (2022) on sentience in decapod crustaceans is well-researched,
clearly organized, and well-written. In our view, it meets its goals of presenting a framework for
recognizing sentience (pain) in animals and of showing that decapods meet the framework’s
criteria and are hence likely to be sentient. It also offers a blueprint for future studies by exposing
the gaps in current knowledge.
We consider sentience to be the same thing as primary consciousness [having the capacity
to feel, Mallatt & Feinberg, 2020] so we will use the terms “sentience” and “consciousness”
interchangeably in this commentary. We should also point out that we are on record as
hypothesizing that all the arthropods are sentient, based on various lines of reasoning and
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evidence, many of which match those in the target article (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2018; Mallatt et
al., 2021).
The eight criteria for sentience proposed by Crump et al. are nicely balanced between four
neural criteria and four cognitive-behavioural criteria. Relatively small in number and condensed
yet informative, these criteria are easy to use for judging whether animals have sentience (see
also the similar, but less-succinct, list of criteria in Feinberg & Mallatt, 2020).
1. Nociception
2. Sensory integration
3. Integrated nociception
4. Analgesia: (a) endogenous (b) exogenous
5. Motivational trade-offs
6. Flexible self-protection
7. Associative Learning
8. Analgesia preference: (a) self-administer (b) location (c) prioritised

Eight criteria for pain sentience
(Crump et al., 2022, §2.2)

Crump et al. state many of their criteria in ways that provide new insights into recognizing
and understanding sentience. Here are some examples: Criterion 4 (Analgesia) ties together the
actions of neurotransmitter chemicals and anesthetic chemicals as modulators of behavioural
responses indicating pain; previous authors had split these into confusing jumbles of diverse
criteria. Criterion 5, the conscious ability to make behavioral trade-offs by weighing positive
versus negative stimuli, is rightly described as motivational trade-offs. This emphasizes that
consciousness can motivate specific behaviors as well as help to choose them. This in turn allows
behavioral flexibility. The target article defines flexibility as implying “that the animal can respond
to the same noxious stimulus in different ways, depending on its situation” (p. 7).
Like Crump et al., we have always viewed flexible wound-tending as evidence that an
animal feels pain (Criterion 6, Flexible self-protection). However, we did not infer that this
implied the animal has “an internal representation of the location of the aversive stimulus.” We
are happy to embrace this connection because we view neural maps of one’s body regions in the
brain as themselves a sign of consciousness (Feinberg & Mallatt, 2016).
According to Criterion 7, associative learning can indicate sentience. Crump et al.
emphasize the importance of “yoked controls” in experiments that test for such learning (p. 21):
“a ‘yoked control’ is an animal that receives the exact same aversive stimuli as an animal in the
test group, but unpaired with any neutral stimulus.” The target article helpfully explains that a
yoked control can rule out the possibility that the learning is just a non-associative sensitization
or habituation to the aversive stimulus. It also rules out the possibility that the response is not
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due to learning at all, but to exhaustion from repeatedly responding to that stimulus during
training.
With Criterion 8 (Analgesia preference), Crump et al. provide a useful explanation of why
an animal that accesses analgesics is likely to be an animal who can feel pain (p. 24): learning an
“active preference for analgesics or anaesthetics may also indicate the animal’s subjectively
perceived aversion to nociceptive inputs, whilst separating this from the other direct effects of
physical injury itself (e.g., impaired functioning).”
Other commenters on the target article have been pointing out that many of the eight
criteria share overlapping parts, so they have been proposing ways to combine, eliminate, or
down-weight certain criteria (Irvine, 2022; Jablonka & Ginsburg, 2022; Walters, 2022). These
commenters offer ways to whittle the number of criteria down to four or three. A shorter and
more compact list may indeed have some advantages. However, eight criteria seem few enough.
Crump et al.’s Table 1 conveys the target article’s findings aptly by using all eight. Another reason
we support using all eight criteria is that they match the categories of published studies:
nociceptor studies, studies on integrative neural networks, neurotransmitter studies, trade-off
studies, associative-learning studies, analgesic-administering studies, etc. Combining the criteria
could make these studies more difficult to find in the literature, hampering efforts to answer
questions about animal sentience.
Finally, woven through the target article’s presentation of the eight criteria is an underlying
concept of the function of consciousness, characterized as follows:
“Sentience in humans plausibly facilitates flexible cognitive functions to maximise
benefits and minimise harms. By integrating information across the animal’s whole
nervous system to generate evaluations, sentience also plausibly facilitates flexible
decision-making and new forms of associative learning… A related idea is that sentience
may provide a ‘common currency’ for decision-making [this currency being a continuum
of good to bad emotional feelings along which perceived stimuli are assigned]… allowing
an animal to combine and compare information across different modalities and times.
Sentience would thereby enable the animal to prioritise its most urgent needs, leading
to beneficial motivational trade-offs in novel situations.” (p. 3)

For extended considerations of the functions (adaptive roles) of consciousness, see Feinberg &
Mallatt (2019; 2020).
The semi-quantitative grading system the authors use to evaluate decapods for sentience
(pp. 8-9) yields a good middle ground between making quantitative decisions that are too rigid
and making qualitative decisions that are too uncertain. Crump et al. make effective use of
confidence levels (very high, high, medium, and low), both in the way these levels are first applied
to each criterion (p. 8 and Table 1) and then again in tallying multiple criteria to determine the
probability of an Infraorder being sentient (p. 9).
Another strength of the target article is that it deeply and critically evaluates the literature.
Rather than just accepting other authors’ conclusions, Crump et al. point out problems in some
of the experimental designs--especially with the use of control groups. Their critical review
reports many null or negative findings along with the positive ones, to evaluate all the evidence
in forming its conclusions (in their Table 1). For example, on pp. 18-19, Crump et al. show that
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the evidence for motivational trade-offs in decapods is weaker than is commonly believed. There
is some better evidence for such trade-offs in an article by Herberholz & Marquart (2012) on
crabs that the target article overlooks, although the aversive stimuli in that study were
threatening rather than painful (Woodruff, 2022).
In an earlier target article in this journal, Birch (2017) suggested that every taxonomic Order
of animals should be evaluated for sentience. We responded that testing so many low-level taxa
would be a waste of effort because sentience is likely to characterize higher clades than an Order,
such as all the amniote vertebrates (“reptiles,” birds, and mammals) or all the vertebrates, period
(Mallatt, 2017). We now better understand Birch’s strategy and embrace it, as it is applied in the
new target article. The fine-grained division into Suborders and Infraorders, as codified in Crump
et al.’s Table 1, reveals important cross-taxon trends in the findings as well as highlighting the
knowledge gaps to be filled by future research.
We would question Crump et al.’s decision to mix (1) the evidence against sentience
(failures) with (2) evidence that is insufficient (due to having been understudied) into a single
category of ‘low confidence’ (p. 8). The reason the authors do not separate these seems to be
that they cannot prove that any decapod fails any criterion (p. 24). Although this is true in the
extreme sense (because absence of evidence is not evidence of absence), we are all in the
business of evaluating which organisms are sentient, and hence which organisms are not. Thus,
Crump et al. should have analyzed the studies and weighed the odds that their decapods were
truly failing a criterion or sub-criterion--a failure that seemed likely, for example, when repeated
experiments found that decapods did not react to opioids (pp. 15-16; see also the commentary
of Walters, 2022). This is not to imply that the mixed ‘low confidence’ category is useless; but
parsing it into its two evidential subcategories would add valuable information to the target
article’s analyses. Commentators Brown (2022) and Comstock (2022) offer the same sort of
criticism and solution.
Another concern is that the framework includes simple types of associative learning in its
associative-learning criterion (see the discussion of Criterion 7 on p. 7). The simple, classical,
Pavlovian type of learning need not be conscious: when we humans hear the dinner bell, our
ensuing salivation is not a conscious decision. More complex types of associative learning are
needed to demonstrate sentience, such as the ‘global operant learning’ of Feinberg & Mallatt
(2016: 152) and the ‘unlimited or open-ended associative learning’ of Ginsberg & Jablonka (2019)
and Jablonka & Ginsburg (2022) (see also Birch et al., 2020). In another commentary on the
present target article, Woodruff (2022) raises this same issue. Crump et al. defend including
simple types of associative learning because their list allows partial criteria (pp. 8, 6); but to us,
such learning is not a marker of sentience and is hence incorrect.
Although we are suggesting that Crump et al. not use simple associative learning in their
future analyses, its use in the target article does not invalidate their positive conclusions about
decapod sentience because they do document many studies that showed advanced associative
learning along with the simple, Pavlovian studies. For example, the long analysis of true crabs on
pp. 21-22 abundantly documented avoidance learning, which is a type of operant learning.
Furthermore, an uncited paper by Abramson & Feinman (1990) found that crabs easily pass the
paradigmatic lever-pressing test for operant learning [but see also Abramson & Calvo’s 2022
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current commentary]. Further support for Crump et al.’s argument is the evidence for operant
learning in another important group of decapods, the lobsters and crayfish, as reviewed on p. 23.
In conclusion, we find that the target article makes a strong case for decapod sentience,
within the criterial framework that it offers. It also raises an idea for further research on the
subject based on the fact that crabs and lobsters have only about 100,000 neurons in their
nervous systems (Decapod Crustaceans, animalresearchinfo.org). This is a startlingly small
number, considering that it is fewer neurons than in most insects (Table 9.2 in Feinberg & Mallatt,
2016), even though insects have much smaller bodies. How could so few neurons provide these
decapods with so advanced a process as sentience and its associated behaviors? The answer we
propose is that their small nervous system has extremely efficient neural circuitry (Chittka &
Niven, 2009) and that its individual neurons process much more information than does a neuron
of vertebrates or even insects. This hypothesis can be tested neurobiologically in decapods.
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